Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
CAPS Working Paper Series

Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 亞洲太平洋研究
中心

1994

Corruption by design : bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing
Melanie MANION

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/capswp
Part of the Political Science Commons, and the Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
Commons

Recommended Citation
Manion, M. (1994). Corruption by design: Bribery in Chinese enterprise licensing (CAPS Working Paper
Series No.13). Retrieved from Lingnan University website: http://commons.ln.edu.hk/capswp/80

This Paper Series is brought to you for free and open access by the Centre for Asian Pacific Studies 亞洲太平洋研
究中心 at Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in CAPS Working Paper Series
by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Working Paper Series

No. 13 (6/94) CAPS
CORRUPTION BY DESIGN:
BRIBERY IN CHINESE
ENTERPRISE LICENSING

by
Dr. Melanie Manion

Faculty of Social Sciences
Lingnan College
Hong Kong
香港嶺南學院

社會科學院

No. 13 (6/94) CAPS
CORRUPTION BY DESIGN:
BRIBERY IN CHINESE
ENTERPRISE LICENSING

by
Dr. Melanie Manion

嶺南學院圖書館

i 8 NOV 1
Ll NG NAN COLLEGE Ll BRAR"

Faculty of Social Sciences
Lingnan College
Hong Kong
1994

CORRUPTION BY DESIGN:
BRIBERY IN CHINESE
ENTERPRISE LICENSING

These working papers are circulated to invite discussion and critical comment. These papers may be
freely circulated but they are not to be quoted without the written pennission of the author. Please
address comments and suggestions to the author or the series editors.

Editorial Board

Centre for Asian Pacific Studies:

i IltL 立 7以/

Dr. Brian Bridges
Dr. Kui Yin Cheung
Prof. Y. Y. Kueh
Dr. David Newman

Centre for Public Policy Studies:
Dr. Che Wai Kin
Mr. John Dixon
Prof. Y. Y. Kueh
Prof. David Weimer

@

Melanie Manion

Dr. Manion is Assistant Professor of Political Science , University of Rochester ,
visiting at the Faculty of Social Sciences , Lingnan College in 1994-95.

Faculty of Social Sciences
Lingnan College
15 Stubbs Road
Hong Kong
Tel: 572 2226
Fax: 891 7940

Working Paper Series
旦旦旦

Author

1 (1193)

Growth into a market economy:
The "Incremental Approach" in China

Dr. Fan Gang

2 (2/93)

中國第一部證券法起草中的

No.

厲以學教授

若平問題

3 (3/93)

Social Inequality in Singapore:
A Dual Economy Approach

Dr. William K.M. Lee

4 (4/93)

European Monetary Integration:
Experiences and Future Prospects

Prof. Dieter Cassel
and Dr. Thomas Apolte

5 (5/93)

Wh ither Hong Kong in an Open-Door,
Reforming Chinese Economy?

Mr. Y.P.Ho
and Pro f. Y. Y. Kueh

6 (6/93)

China' s Ri se , Russia' s Fall:
Policy Choice or System Difference

Dr. Peter N olan

7 (7/93)

Economic Integration Within Greater
China: Trade and Investment Flows
Between Mainland China, Hong Kong
and Taiwan

Dr. Robert F. Ash
and Pro f. Y. Y. Kueh

8 (1 /94)

North Korean Nuclear Weapons Policy:
An Expected Utility An alysis

Dr. David Newman
and D r. Brian Bridges

9 (2/94)

Economic Reforms and Inequality
in China

Dr. Joseph C. H. Chai
and Ms. B. Karin Chai

10 (3/94)

Industrial Deregulation and
Economic Restructuring in China:
A GA TT Perspe'C tive

Pro f. Y. Y. Kueh

11 (4/94)

The Political Development of China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong Since the Late
1970s: Problems and Prospects

Mr. Wong Yiu-chung

12 (5/94)

Decreasing Cost and Profit Maximization
in Cournot Duopoly Models

Dr. Lei Kai -cheong

13 (6/94)CAPS

Corruption by D'esign:Bribery in Chinese
Enterprise Licensing

Dr. Melanie Manion

CORRUPTION BY DESIGN:
BRIBERY IN CHINESE ENTERPRISE

LICENSll可G

Melanie Manion, Department ofPolitical Science, University ofRochester
Faculty of Social Sciences , Lingnan College, Hong Kong in 1994-95
This work was presented originally at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the Am erican Political
Science Association, in New York , September 1-4, 1994. 1 thank David Austen-Smith,
Je岱eyBa也 s， Avery Goldstein , Nina Halpern , Mi chel Oksenberg, and David Weimer for
helpful comments and suggestions. 1 thank the National Academy of Science, Committee on
Scholar1y Communication with China for research suppo此.
November 24 , 1994. Not for citation without the author's permission.

Abstract

This arti c1 e presents a game theoretic institutional analysis ofbureaucratic corruption: bribery
in Chinese enterprise licensing. Fonnal structures and infonnal expectations are identified as
features of "institutional design" that shape choices by strategic individuals to produce
corrupt outcomes. Bribery (as an equilibrium) is deductively derived as a solution in a
signaling game; the game fonn is empirically derived from features of institutional design.
Exercises in comparative statics explore the robustness ofbribery as an equilibrium \vhen
game parameter values are altered to reflect changes in institutional design. The exercises
indicate that reducing corruption , in the sense of reducing bribe sizes , is relatively
unproblelnatic. To lnove a\vay entirely from coπupt equi 1i bria , ho\vever, requires far more
dralnatic change in institutional design and may not be feasible through changes in fonnal
structures alone.
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CORRUPTION BY DESIGN:
BRIBERY IN CHINESE ENTERPRISE LICENSING

1. Introduction.

The transition from socialist planning to a more marketized economy on mai nI and

China，的

elsewhere, has been accompanied by the growth of economic crime and the emergence of
new forms of political corruption (see, e.g. , Chan and Unger 1982 , Liu 1983 , Forster 1985 ,
Ostergaard 1986 , Myers 1989, Lee 1990 , Sands 1990, Ostergaard and Petersen 1991 , Liew
1993). Indeed , political corruption -- defined here as deviation from duties of public
pursue private gain , in a manner that violates formal rules (see Nye
endemic, appearing as a normal practice in many

di缸erent

1967) 一 has

0伍 ce

to

become

contexts. As the formal rules

reflect where the state has drawn for itself the "normative line" between the allocative roles
of market and nonmarket mechanisms , the study of political

coπuption

focuses on a key

question in political economy: "the way in which wealth and market forces can undermine
whatever dividing line has been fixed" (Rose-Ackerman 1978: 1-2). This article explains
endemic corruption as the product of choices by strategic individuals optimizing in

戶口icular

contexts of formal structures and informal expectations. Put another w句， structures and
expectations are features of "institutional design" that shape choices to produce

coπupt

outcomes
The formal analysis of particular forms of corruption as products of particular
institutional designs was pursued originally by Rose-Ackerman (1978) and more recen t1 y by
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) . Here, however , the analysis explicitly considers the role of
expectations. Moreover, here the thesis is described and tested through game theoretic
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an aI ysis: corruption (as an equilibrium) is deductively derived as a solution in a game; the
game fonn is empiricalIy

derived 企om

features of institutional design.

The observation (or inference) that corruption is a nonn aI practice in a wide variety of
contexts can be restated , in

g缸ne

theoretic tenns , as the folIowing hypothesis: corruption is

an equilibrium solution in many different games , where the game form describes the
institutional design of the strategic situation. This fonnulation has a number\ of advantages in
establishing a research agenda for the study of corruption.
First , it indicates a methodological approach that addresses a key obstacle to research
on corruption: the inherent

di伍 culty

of reliable measuremen t. Ri gorous empirical

investigation of corruption is hindered by the ilIegality (or impropriety) of corrupt actions ,
which are typicalIy hidden from public view. A game theoretic institutional approach does
not make the evidence problem disappear. It does , however, refocus empirical work , from
the problematic measurement of corrupt actions to the more manageable task of describing
features of institutional design. It also refocuses analytical

work，合om

data manipulation to

fonnal modeling.
Secondly , in addition to facilitating descriptive and explanatory rigor, a game
theoretic institutional approach lends itself to exercises in comparative statics that test the
robustness of corruption as an equilibrium when parameter values , re f1 ecting institutional
design , are altered. This is only sensible in the context of rapid economic refonn , where new
structural changes are formaIly adopted (i f not always implemented) on a near continuous
basis. Such exercises also have predictive (and implicitly prescriptive) value, indicating the
possibilities and limitations for redesigning institutions through policy instruments to escape
coπupt

equilibria, if efficiency and distributional effects are considered to merit it. Finally,

comparative statics exercises are at the same time studies in comparative institutional
2
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analysis. As these exercises show the contribution of both structures and expectations, they
explain how the same formal structures can produce different outcomes in different contexts
of expectations, which define different cu 1tures.
This article analyzes as a game a form of routine bureaucratic corruption: bribery in
the enterprise licensing process that takes place in Chinese government bureaus of industry
and commerce. The bribery analyzed here has the following interesting feature , which is by
no means peculiar to enterprise licensing. In principle, bureaucratic rules alone govem
allocation of some good or service (here , enterprise licenses) at a predetermined small price
to all qualified applicants. In practice , however, qualified applicants provide additional
illegal private compensation to public

0伍 cials

for a standard good or service. That is,

corrupt overpayments are made for a good or service that is not in fixed supply and to which
the applicants are , in principle , fully entitled.
AJthough relatively petty (compared , for example, to spectacular cases of Chinese
official profiteering) , this form of corruption is of particular political relevance. Here,
ordinary citizens interacting normally with government officiaIs act as accomplices of corrupt
officials in sustaining bribery as a usual practice. This involvement of citizens in the routine
deviation of state functionaries from

the 印 les

the state has set for itself undermines both

those who rule and rules generally: it reinforces a view that the regime is incapable of
governing itsel f, much less its citizens , and it impedes the fragile development of a norm of
law.
I begin below by identifying in more detail the characteristics of bribery in enterprise
licensing. I follow with an empirical description of enterprise licensing in terms of its key
institutional features. I then formalize the description in a model of enterprise licensing as a
signaling game and go on to pursue an explanatory aim by deriving the conditions for which
3
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bribery constitutes an equilibrium solution (and the equilibrium bribe size). 1 illustrate the
solution with a numerical example, using plausible values for game parameters. The game
and example are the point of departure for an analysis of the value of personal connections in
obtaining an enterprise license and for exercises in comparative statics, which explore the
robustness of bribery as an equilibrium when parameter values are altered to reflect changes
in institutional design. The comparative statics exercises allow me to make Some predictive
statements about the effects of recent policy changes and ongoing anti-corruption efforts on
the form of corruption analyzed here.
My understanding of formal institutional design features of enterprise licensing is
based mainly on

0 伍 cial

sources. The most important of these are officials interviewed at the

State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) , officials interviewed at licensing
offices in local bureaus of industry and commerce, and documents and local

repo 口 s

in the

. S Al C departmental journal
As noted above , the illicit character of corruption frustrates
empl 討 cal

effo口 s

at rigorous

measurement of corrupt transactions. 1 considered it useful nonetheless to do some

empirical investigation into the dependent variable. To this end , 1 conducted unofficial
interviews with Chinese entrepreneurs who had licensed enterprises since the mid-1980s.
These sources supplemented official accounts with information about informal dimensions of
enterprise licensing and also provided some empirical basis for the discussion of expectations
relevant to bribery in enterprise licensing.
2. Bribery in Chinese

~nterprise

Licensing.

Chinese economic reforms in the 1980s, which transformed managerial incentives in the state
sector and promoted expansion of the non-state sector, Ied to the emergence of many new
enterprises and new forms of ownership and managemen t. The number of registered
4
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domestic enterprises in the collective sector grew rapidly 一企om 1. 5 millionin 1981 t04.2
million in 1992. A significant domestic private sector re-emerged: registered individual
enterprises grew from 1. 8 million in 1981 to 15.3 million in 1992; larger private enterprises
emerged in the mid-1980s , with about 140 thousand registered private enterprises in
operation in 1992 (Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli tongji sishi nian 1992:3 , 164;
Zhongguo gongshang xingzheng guanli nianjian 1993:531 , 555 , 559). At tþe same time,

existing enterprises in the state and collective sectors expanded , adapted , or diversified to
encompass new production and business lines.
Al l industrial and commercial ejl加pTises in mainland China require government

authorization to engage in production or business activity. New enterprises require licenses
to obtain legal status for their economic activity, and changes in the economic activity of
existing enterprises require authorization through changes of license. The government
department assigned to this task is the SAl C. 1
Tÿpically, enterprise licenses authorizing specified economic activity are obtained at
licensing offices in the SAl C's subordinate bureaus of industry and commerce located
throughout the country. A recent Chinese study of corruption identifies these local bureaus
as among a hand加 of government departments in which most bureaucratic corruption is
concentrated (Gong 1991 :8-9).2 Repo討 s on corruption witrun bureaus of industry and
commerce cite enterprise licensing as one of a few areas in wruch abuses of public

0伍 ce

violations of law and discipline are common (see , e.g. , SAl C, Investigation Group
SAl C 23 July 1988 , 4 Sep t.

1990~

and

1986~

Liu 1990, 1993).

Corruption in enterprise licensing typically takes the form of bribery by applicants for
enterprise licenses. Payments may be cash or non-cash gifts or favors. Published Chinese
repo口 s

on co汀uption in enterprise licensing discuss
5
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of illicit fees ("goodwill fees ,"
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"processing fees ," "personal commissions," "tea fees") and undisguised cash bribes to
individual 0伍cials， as well as personalloans, gifts , and invitations to dinner. To this list
entrepreneurs interviewed added payments of shares in enterprises and a variety of services
such as photocopying, use of private vehicles, installation of residential telephones ,
assistance in school placement for children , and household repairs. According to
entrepreneurs interviewed , such transactions can also take place aaer applicpnts and o伍 cials
have established personal connections , apa此企om the formal relationship defined by
allocation of enterprise licenses.
/

Reports from anti-corruption campaigns (whatever their bias) indicate that bribe
amounts vary widely. For example, in 1985 and 1986, a campaign in a district bureau in
Xi'an resu 1t ed in over a hundred reported refusals of gifts and cash bribes totalling over
11 ,000 yuan (S Al C , Investigation Group 1986). Over a period of a few months in 1989 , a
campaign in a Beijing district bureau resulted in about the same number of repo 巾 d refusals ,
but the total amount came to only about 6 ,000 yuan (Ma 1990). 1n 1988 through 1990,
campaigns in twelve provinces resulted in 155 ,000 repo口 ed refusals of gifts and bribes
totalling about ten million yuan , including individual cases of bribes in amounts over 10 , 000
yuan (Liu 1990). Exchanges completed and unreported are probably higher yet: for example,
one licensing official in Nantong (J iangsu province) used his position to "borrow" a total of
220 , 000 yuan from six different enterprises (Zhongguo gongshang bao 26 Mar. 1992:2).

A1 1 of the transactions noted above are officially defined as acts of impropriety that
clearly violate disciplinary standards set out in SAIC regulations (S Al C 23 July 1988 , 20
Ma r. 1990). According to Chinese criminallaw, most such transactions are also illega1. 1n a
discussion ofthe Iaws on bribery and their interpretation in the courts, Sun (1990 :4 7-6 月
identifies the substitution of material private interests for the public interest as the key
6
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harmful feature of bribe巾， which harms the "normal functioning of the bureaucracy" and the
"reputation of state functionaries." Consequent1 y, the courts consider the question of specific
economic loss to the state or specific social harm as immaterial to a dete口nination that an
action constitutes bribery. A1 so immaterial is whether or not transactions involve those with
whom officials have personal connections and whether or not benefits sought are in fact
obtained.3
The law defines the crime of accepting a bribe as: "any action by a state functionary
.. . to exact material gain or accept inappropriate (bu zhengdang) material gain from an
individual for exploiting the resources of public office to seek benefits for that individual."
In addition , "receipt in any guise of a personal commission or processing fee by a state
functionary in the course of an economic transaction and in violation of state regulations" is
considered as accepting a bribe. Offering a bribe is also a crime, defined as: "offering
material gain to a state functionary ... for actions that exploit the resources of public office to
seek inappropriate benefits" (Sixth National People's Congress, Standing Committee 21 Jan.
1988:34 , 36)
These definitions are interesting for their implications about the costs ofbribery. For
officials , accepting an offer of inappropriate material gain to exploit public office to seek
benefits for an individual constitutes the crime of accepting a bribe; for applicants, however ,
precisely such an offer is not a crime unless the benefits sought are themselves inappropriate.
The law is quite specific on this point. If an individual is "compelled by a state functionary ...
to give some material payment and no inappropriate benefits are obtained , this does not
constitute the crime of offering a bribe" (Sixth National People's Congress, Standing
Committee 21 Jan. 1988:36). Sun (1990:64) elaborates on these circumstances:
7
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The benefit sought is not il1 egal. Rather, it is not only pem世tted by law and
regulations , but also the individual is fully enti t1 ed to it. But because state
functionaries do not perfonn their duties responsibly or are deliberately
obstructive and coercive, the individual enti t1 ed to the benefit is faced with
delay in obtaining it or

di伍 cu 1ty

in obtaining it. . The individual is driven to no

other alternative but to offer a bribe , contrary to his convictions. This act
lacks the deliberate purpose of offering a bribe. ... If an individual finds
himself compelled to offer material gain to a public official in order to obtain
a benefit to which he is entitled , this is not a crime of offering a bribe.

The fonn of bribery analyzed here is only very subtly distinct from these
circumstances. To avoid costly delays , applicants may make corrupt overpayments to
licensing officials for enterprise licenses to which they are fully entitled. In making such
payments , however , applicants do not know whether the bribes are overpayments or
reasonable fees for valuable illicit services. This important feature of bribery in enterprise
licensing is explained below , as a product ofthe institutional design of licensing
3. Institutional Design of Enterprise Licensing.

The Chinese government has not set explicit limits or targets aimed at achieving some
optimal number of enterprises or otherwise fixed the supply of enterprise licenses. 4 In
pnnclp 泊，

enterprise licensing is simply authorization to engage in specific economic activity

and registration ofbasic information about enterprises. Nonetheless , in the context ofthe
economic refonns , enterprise licensing has been no simple matter of enterprise registration.

3.1. Jnformation A 矽n1metry.
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s , official stipulations for acceptable enterprise license
8
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applications great1y increased in number and specificity. Relevant laws, regulations , rules ,
measures, notices, and opinions were periodically revised or revoked to reflect changes in
economic policy orientation. One resu 1t of all this is a situation of extreme information
asymmetry that can be summarized as follows: at the time they submit applications to
licensing officials , applicants usually do not know whether or not their materials meet the
standards defining acceptable applications , but

0伍cials

do know.

Because enterprise licensing was not well estab !i shed in the pre-reform period ,
official stipulations defining acceptable applications for enterprise licenses are all fairly
recen t. An initial set of regulations on enterprise licensing was issued in 1982. By 1992 the
government and its departments had issued over 130 documents on enterprise licensing
(SAIC 1nterview 92121) .5 Many stipulations are general to all enterprises: all applicants are
required to complete standardized application forms and submit documentation on financial
resources , place of production or business , eligible employees , and prior examination and
approval by the government departments that have authority over the trades or industrial
sectors of the proposed enterprise economic activities. There are also stipulations about
acceptable enterprise names and acceptable designations of form and scope of enterprise
econornic activities. 1n addition , local governments , local bureaus of industry and commerce ,
and other local government departments issue their own stipulations on enterprise licensing.
A great many other requirements are defined for specific types of products and
enterprises. These requirements are met by obtaining

permits 丘om

vanous government

departments -- including departments of city planning, public health , environmental
protection, and (for some designated "special trades") public security. The greatest number
of required perrnits are those issued by government economic departments associated with
the planned economy. 1n late 1992 , applicants for enterprises could require 200 or more
9
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pennits prior to submitting applications to licensing 。但 ces. Requirements exceeding 100
pennits were not uncommon (SAIC 1nterview 92121).
A strict adherence to these 。但cia1 stipulations creates incentives for otherwise Iegal
economic activities and enterprises to go unlicensed and , therefore, unmonitored by the
department established specificalI y for these purposes. Moreover, standards communicated
in government documents re f1 ect economic policy at the time they are formulated and issued
-- and almost as soon as standards began be formalized in the early 198 郎， IocaI bureaus of
industry and commerce found that their specific content Iagged behind subsequent changes in
economic policy orientation. An early arti cI e in the SAIC journaI asked: what ought local
officials to do when what appears to be reasonable is not strictly IegaI , and vice versa? 1t
con cI uded that regulations not conforming to the "new situation" of economic reform ought
not necessarily to be observed (Fan 1984).
Leading officiaIs in the SAIC have tended to agree with this view. They noted in
interviews that local bureaus of industry and commerce are required in principle to license
enterprises in accordance with SAIC regulatioñs. 1n practice , however, the SAIC has
permitted the bureaus to ignore some regulations because of "the contradiction between the
oId and new systems." The criterion used to evaluate Iocal implementation is not officiaI
standards but "concrete results ," mainly as these relate to economic policy orientation (SAIC
Interviews 93081 and 93082).
Not surprisingly, then , officiaI stipulations on enterprise licensing do not re f1 ect
operative standards communicated to licensing officials by leaders in locallicensing offices.
1n practice, at least some (and after 1992 a great many) stipulations are selectively waived .6
Through channels such as office meetings and organized study of 0伍 cial documents , leaders
in Iocallicensing offices communicate to subordinate officials in charge of evaluating license
10
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applications what is "really required" and what is "not important to fuss about" (Licensing
0伍 ce

Interview 92121).
It is

clear 企om

published accounts and interviews with entrepreneurs that applicants

are normally unfamiliar with the various

0伍 cial

and operative standards that define

acceptable applications for enterprise licenses (see, e.g. , Fang 1991; Wan 1992). Documents
that contain 0伍 cial stipulations are not easily accessible. 7 Both official and 9perative
standards are too many , too detailed , and too frequen tI y changing to be mastered by
outsiders. Indeed , according to a leading SAIC official , it is practically impossible for
anyone without considerable experience inside the system to know what is realI y required to
Iicense an enterprise (SAIC Interview 93082). As a result , applicants submit applications
they know cannot meet the stringent and largely unfamiliar 0伍 cial standards , although they
do not know whether or not they meet operative standards.
3.2. Evaluation 01 Applications as

th叫你的 Locus

01 Bri bely.

The SAIC does not dictate to IocaI bureaus of industry and commerce internal bureaucratic
procedures. Procedures va句， therefore , across Iicensing
basic sequential procedures are

pa討 of enterprise

0伍 ces

(and also over time). Four

Iicensing in all offices , howeve r. They are:

initial evaluation of application materials to determine their acceptability, investigation and
verification of materials to determine their validity, approval of enterprise licenses , and issue
of licenses. According to leaders at locallicensing

offic的，

evaluation of application

materials is the most important and demanding of these administrative tasks. It is the only
position that brings licensing officials into routine contact with applicants. Not surprisingly,
it is the main locus of bribery in enterprise licensing.
Evaluation of application materials requires officials to apply and explain standards.
0臼 cials

responsible for evaluation are supposed to possess a thorough knowledge of formal
11
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and operative standards for acceptable applications and be able to exercise bureaucratic
discretion responsibly. Temporary personnel are not assigned to this position, and (b arring
discovery of irregularities) rotation of officials assigned to this position is uncommon.
Locallicensing

0伍 ces

have territorialI y-based monopolies on issuing licenses for

enterprises in their localities. Officials in charge of evaluation of application materials can
also enjoy a monopoly: in large licensing
applications for

pa口icular

0伍 ces，

individual

0伍 cials

often specialize in

forms of enterprise (organized by territorial scope of operation ,

ownersrup sector, or economic activity). 1n smalI er offices, applicants in a single queue
usually present themselves to officials on a first-come-first-served basis.
Reports 丘 om

local bureaus of industry and commerce rationalize specialization in

terms of e伍 ciency gains , but acknowledge the greater opportunities for bribery inherent in
monopoly powe r. The sequential organization of licensing procedures is supposed to check
these opportunities: to promote cI ean government through mutual monitoring in licensing
(see, e.g. , Kong 1990; Zhang 1990; Dalian MunicipaIi ty , Jinzhou District Bureau of1ndustry
and Cornmerce 1991; Hunan Province, Hengyang Municipal Bureau of 1ndustry and
Commerce , Office of Supervision 1992). Acceptance of application materials

泊，

therefore ,

routinely followed by investigation and verification of materials by a different set of
licensing

0伍 cials.

1n the past few years , licensing offices have reduced investigation and

verification requirements and substituted more stringent post-licensing inspection of
ente叩 rises .

To the extent that investigation and verification (or inspection) procedures are

thorough and legitimate , these arrangements provide checks on officials who evaluate
application materials.8 A third procedure -- approval -- can act as a further check. But
approval usually issues from the licensing office head (or deputy head) , who has many other
responsibilities too and is unlikely to turn up any but the most obvious inadequacies.
12
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Investigation and verification, approva] , and inspection follow evaluation and
acceptance of materials. Such checks as these later procedures provide are absent , therefore,
if application materials are rejected: the application process is provisionally terminated if
materials are evaluated as unacceptable. Some licensing

0伍 ces

requlre

0伍 cials

to provide

applicants with written explanations with rejected applications , to avoid misunderstandings
about what is required to bring applications up to standard. Even so , no
exists to monitor

r司 ections.

For the most

pa此，

decisions to

r只ject

ro~tine

mechanism

applications are

independent , unmonitored , and fina l. 9
3.3. Expected Costs of Rejected Applicatiol1 s.
Wh en licensing 0伍 cials evaluate and r貝ject applications , they indicate to applicants what

changes or additional materials are required. In principle, acceptance is always attainable -but not necessarily at first try. Rejected applications are associated with

di丘erent

expected

costs for applicants and officials.
Consider first the cost to applicants of making changes or obtaining the additional
approvals , permits , or other materials in which (officials signal) their applications are
deficien t. 10 This process of revising (and resubmitting) application materials can consume
great amounts of time. Entrepreneurs 1 interviewed consider imposition of time costs as the
greatest discretionary power licensing

0伍 cials

possess. In their view, bureaucratic standards

provide officials with many possible reasons to reject applications and impose time costs.
These are also the costs entrepreneurs most want to avoid paying. It is difficu 1t to estimate
how long the process of revising will take (estimates ranged from several months to a year)
and how exacting licensing officials will be in evaluating revised applications. For
entrepreneurs , time is critical (as one commented: "time is money") , because 10st time can
mean lost market opportunities.
13
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Wh en entrepreneurs comment that licensing 0伍 cials can reject applications more or
less at will and stall acceptance for a long time, this re f1 ects beliefs about low expected costs
to 0伍 cials of rejecting applications. These beliefs are consistent with the 企amework of
monitoring and incentives within which licensing officials actually work. Officials incur no
costs in "r貝jecting applications that are by operative standards unacceptable: this is doing their
job. Rejecting applications that are in fact acceptable is not similarly cost1 es戶， but because
the probability of detecting rejections and the pena1t ies imposed if detected are both quite
low , the expected costs of 吋 ecting acceptable applications are low
The question of penalties is straightforward. For reasons discussed in section 3.1
above , applications for enterprise licenses are unlikely at first try (or indeed ever) strictly to
meet 0 伍 cial standards of acceptability. Wh ile applications are more likely to meet operative
standards , the continued existence of st巾 gent official standards allows 0丘icials to reject
applications at relatively low cos t. These standards are a resource that can be exploited in
rejecting applications: if detected ，。伍 cials who reject acceptable applications are overly
strict , but not obviously arbitrary. Penalties may be imposed for bureaucratic workstyle , but
these are unlikely to be very serious. 11
Moreover, rejections of acceptable applications are unlikely to be detected at al 1. As
discussed above , only applications that have been accepted are sent on for further
consideration by other licensing 0伍 cials. 1n addition , because enterprise licensing is a
territorial monopoly (and , if there is specialization , a monopoly within individuallicensing
offices) , there is no implicit monitoring through competition. U n1 ess they choose to locate in
a different locality , entrepreneurs whose applications have been rejected cannot try at another
licensing office to obtain a second opinion. When evaluation procedures are not specialized
by type of enterprise, allowing applicants to choose among licensing officials , entrepreneurs
14

Corruption by Design

whose applications are rejected are apparently nonetheless u n1ikely to obtain a reversal from
co-workers in the
the same

0伍 ce

0伍 ce.

One entrepreneur explained this as follows: "These people work in

day after day , their relationship is an ongoing one. They would not want to

do anything to upset this relationship. ... 1 am on1 y someone who comes in for a license, 1 am
not someone at work. So if one

0伍cial

says something, the other does not contradict it"

(E ntrepreneur Interview 93074).
There is a formal administrative appeaIs process that applicants can take up ifthey
believe

0伍 cials

have acted improperly in rejecting applications for enterprise Ii censes (see

SAl C 20 July 1990). F or a number of reasons , however, applicants are unlikely to resort to
formal appeaIs. To begin with , applicants do not know whether or not their applications are
acceptable. This means that applicants who choose the appeals process do so without
certainty that their complaint is valid , but with certainty that official standards are on the side
ofthe officia1. Further, the appeals process does not expedite applications: waiting for the
appropriate office to complete an investigation (and perhaps conclude with a confirmation of
the rejection) is not an attractive choice for entrepreneurs who value time highly.
Administrative appeals are unappealing for another reason too. Entrepreneurs 1
interviewed consider complaints

一 especially

formal complaints -- a poor strategy, because:

"you and this system will be in contact for a long time after you start up your enterprise," and
ll

"the relationship with the bureau of industry and commerce is very important (Entrepreneur
Interview 92123). Enterprises are required to submit annuaI

repo 口 s

and pay annuaI fees to

licensing offices. They are required to re Ii cense if there are changes in ownership , location ,
or economic activity. Licensing new enterprises may be a one-time encounter between
applicants and
licensing

pa口icular

0伍 ces

licensing officiaIs , but the relationship between enterprises and

(and bureaus of industry and commerce) is an ongoing one.
15
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Finally, if licensing

0伍cials

act improperly in rejecting applications, there is always

the possibility that they operate in an environment in which such actions are protected ,
accepted , or at least not actively resisted by localleaders. In such cases, investigation of
appeals is unlikely to meet with success. I take up this issue in greater detail below, in a
、 discussion

of sanctions against bribery.

3.4. Expected Costs 01 Bribery.

Bribery is an a1t ernative to revising and resubmitting applications after they are rejected. The
bribe per se is a cost for applicants and a benefit for officials. In addition to the bribe, there
are expected ë-os~ associated with bribery. These reflect the probability of detection and
L一~→----/

sanctions if dete_cted. Expected costs ofbribery are relevant to both applicants and

0伍 cials，

a1t hough they differ in value. They also depend significantly on whether or not applications
are in fact acceptable. Licensing officials can normally be expected to reject applications that
do not meet operative standards of acceptability. But officials seeking bribes may also reject
acceptable applications.
Consider the expected costs to applicants. 1f their applications are in fact acceptable ,
then the probability that bribery will be detected is low: if applications are acceptable , then
investigation , verification , approval , and inspection procedures will reveal no basis for an
illicit exchange and raise no suspicions. Further, if applications are acceptable, bribe offers
are not unambiguously bribery in the legal sense. 1f the bribery is detected , the basic
acceptability of the rejected applications offers applicants the

oppo討unity

to claim "no other

aIt ernative but to offer a bribe." 1n such circumstances , bribe 0任ers do 'not constitute a crime
of offering a bribe (Sun 1990:64). 1n sum , if rejected applications are acceptable, applicants
are likely to incur no costs beyond the bribe per se.
Both the probability of detection and penalties if detected are higher for applicants if
16
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their applications are unacceptable. In such circumstances, bribe offers constitute bribery in
the legal sense. The crime ofbribery is discussed in the Criminal Law (Fifth National
People's Congress 1 July 1979) and in

c1ari令ring

documents (see especially Fifth National

People's Congress, Standing Committee 8 Mar. 1982; Sixth National People's Congress,
Standing Committee 21 Jan. 1988; Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's
procuratorate6Nov. 1989). For ofrering a bribe, Chinese criminal law speqiEes sanctions
rangmg 企ornforced

labotorA ErisOTImerltfortems ofup to fiveyearsto life Longprison

terms are for "serious circumstances" or circumstances of "serious loss to the state and
collective interest." But none of the c1 arifications by Sun (1990: 56-5 月

suggest

that b討bery

to induce licensing officials to accept unacceptable applications falls under the category of
serious circumstances. Moreover, published Chinese accounts of bribery cases suggest that
applicants \vho offer bribes are treated very leniently unless they commit other crimes as
wel 1. 12
For licensing officials , accepting bribes 一

regardless

of whether applications are

acceptable or unacceptable -- meets the legal definition of bribery. If the bribery is detected
(which is more likely ifthe application is unacceptable) , legal and administrative sanctions
apply. Sanctions against officials who accept bribes depend on the extent of harm caused by
the bribery and the bribe size. Officials who accept bribes of 10 ,000 yuan or more can be
imprisoned for

life~立竺些 e

the death pena1ty. For accepting smaller bribes , officials can be

sentenced to forced labor or imprisonment for up to seven years. In "serious circumstances,"
this sentence can be increased to ten years; in "rninor circumstances," it can be reduced or
waived altogether and administrative disciplinary sanctions by the government substituted.
Sun

(1990 : 56-5 月 cites

as "serious circumstances": bribery causing great harm to the state or

co l1 ective interest , violation of law:; io addition to bribery, participation in a bribery c1 ique,
17
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企equent acceptance of bribes , soliciting bribes , re丘lsal to confess after bribery is discovered ,

bribery involving citizens of foreign countries , and bribery involving nation a1 treasures.
Examples of "minor circumstances" are small bribes and situations where officials tum
themselves in , show remorse, and take the initiative to return bribes. "Mi nor circumstances"
also include those in which 0伍 cials are 忽li1ty of o n1 y "an ordinary travesty of justice" (y iban
Z仰的)

that violates government regulations but no law
If circumstances of bribery are minor，。伍 cials may be sanctioned with government

administrative disciplinary measures . These are clearly set out in State Council regulations
(see especially 13 Sep t. 1988) and SAIC regulations (see especially 20 Mar. 1990). There are
eight grades of administrative discipline: warning , record of error, record of major error,
demotion of rank , demotion of office , dismissal 丘om office, expulsion from cadre ranks with
probation , expulsion from cadre ranks. The SAIC regulations do not speci令 specific
measures for specific violations , but recommend sanctions take into account the seriousness
of the violation and the official's attitude toward his misconduc t. They suggest , for example ,
demotion of rank , demotion of offi 白) or dismissal from office in "fairly serious
circumstances ," where the official has not reformed himself and the consequences of the
violation have been bad.
A

repo 口 (Tu

1991) on obstacles to clean government in bureaus of industry and

commerce indicates that officials assigned to implement measures on clean government often
themselves accept "social trends" such as bribery and do not seriously attempt to resist
routine violations. It notes too that conscientious officials face great interference from
bureau leaders , who oppose investigation of abuses of power because they believe it harms
the reputation of the bureaus. Officials investigating violations have been subject to
discrimination in career oppo口unities . In more extreme cases , they have been threatened and
18
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beaten.
Penalties actual1y meted out to licensing officials for accepting bribes can be very
ligh t. The Nantong official who "borrowed" 220 ,000 yuan was obliged to retum the money
and a major error was recorded in his file (Zhongguo gongshang bao 26 Mar. 1992:2). The
SAIC journal reported as a positive example the Zhuhai municipal bureau of industry and
commerce experience: in the
three

0伍 cials

period 企om

1982 to 1991 , a district bureau had dismissed on1y

for accepting bribes (Guangdong Province, Zhuhai Municipal Bureau of

Industry and Commerce 1991). An ti-corruption measures adoptedby a licensing
Shaanxi county were also reported as an example:

0伍 cials

0伍 ce

ln a

discovered to have received gifts

or accepted invitations to dinner were required to confess publicly and give up their monthly
bonus , but they incurrèd no administrative pena1ties unless they had accepted cash bribes of
300 )心 an or more. Nor were they rotated out oftheir (l ucrative) positions in the licensing
office unless they had accepted larger cash bribes (Shaanxi Province, Mei County Bureau of
Industry and Commerce 1990)
In considering expected costs of bribe句， the discussion above presumes that bribes
offered are accepted , which is equivalent to presuming that no

0伍 cials

refuse bribes. But

included in expected costs to applicants of offering bribes is some cost associated with
attempting to bribe

0缸icials

who do not accept bribes. Presumably, these costs are fairly low:

applicants can make bribe offers sufficiently ambiguous to back away from them should
。伍 cials

not respond positively; corrupt officials may signal informally that rejected

applications can be accepted without revisions. Nonetheless , signals can be misinterpreted.
Clean

0伍 cials

may refuse bribe offers and simply require applicants to revise and resubmit ,

in accordance with their formal signal of r司 ection . But they may also respond to bribe offers
more negatively. For example, they may adopt a more bureaucratic workstyle in reviewing
19
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resubmitted applications or may repo口 bribe offers. Expected costs of offering bribes
include, then, costs associated with attempting to bribe clean officials.

3.5. Priorsfor Encountering Clean Officials.
Prior to submitting their applications to licensing officials, entrepreneurs already have some
notions about how these officials are likely to ac t. These are beliefs about whether or not the
。伍 cials

they encounter will mislead them about the status of app Ii cations , arbitrarily reject

applications as unacceptable , and accept bribes in exchange for reversing rejections of
applications. 1 summarize these beliefs as priors about the Ii kelihood of encountering clean
officials.
In a

repo 口 on

cI ean government (L iu 1990) , the SAIC head acknowledged a poor

public image of officials working at basic levels of the system , but indicated that the situation
had improved since the mid-1980s. He cited (without explanation) figures from Henan
province on the proportion of personnel who violate laws and discipline in the administration
of industry and commerce: that proportion had dropped from more than 10 percent before
1985 to about half a percent by 1990. Whatever the basis for these figures (i .e., whether they
reflect detected violations or estimated actual violations) , both are probably too optimistic.
Judging from interviews with entrepreneurs , applicants typically estimate as low (below ,
perhaps well below , 0.5 percent) the probability of encountering clean licensing officials
Entrepreneurs interviewed also expressed beliefs about actions of other applicants .
Wh en asked about the proportion of applicants who foIIow the application process from

beginning to end without bribery , entrepreneurs rep Ii ed that "most ," "everyone ," or "over
half' resort to some form of bribelγ. These beliefs about what others are doing suppo此 low
priors for encountering clean licensing officials: a beliefthat most other applicants are
offering bribes for licenses implies a belief that bribery in enterprise licensing is a usual
20
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practlce.
Some entrepreneurs 1 interviewed conceded that there were undoubtedly some honest
and efficient officials. Yet , although leaders of locallicensing 。由ces describe their 0伍 ces
as service-oriented , entrepreneurs do not generally seem to view them as such. They
described a bureaucracy with practically no norm of servi伐， in which officials typically must
see some "advantage" (haochu) before they will do their jobs. Given this conception,
applicants do not approach officials expecting service, much less asserting it as a right. One
entrepreneur observed: "Very rarely will you see someone go into the bureau of industry and
commerce and be demanding , with the notion that he is entitled to start up an enterprise and
the bureau of industry and commerce has a job to license him" (Entrepreneur Interview
93074). Applicants approach officials as supplicants , knowing that goodwi Il is required and
believing that goodwill is not dispensed free of charge but must be compensated privately.
Related to the notion that service requires additional compensation is the knowledge,
volunteered by many entrepreneurs interviewed , that licensing officials have low salaries
relative to the applicants they encounte r. 13 The basic view that officials are probably not
efficient or honest functionaries who dispense free goodwill derives also from experiences
with other mainland Chinese bureaucracies and a general conception of how these
bureaucracies and their bureaucrats work.
4. Enterprise Licensing as a Signaling Game.
The institutional features of enterprise licensing described in detail above are the empirical
basis for the game-theoretic analysis in this section. Enterprise licensing is modeled here as a
multi-stage signaling game presented in extensive form. 1 derive the conditions for which
bribery is an equilibrium in the game (and the equilibrium bribe sizes) and offer a numerical
example using plausible game parameter values.
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The game is a model of the procedure, identified above as an important locus of
bribery, in which applicants submit application fonns and accompanying materials to
licensing

0伍 cials

is il1 ustrated

for initial evaluation and (if accepted)

in 且即 re

如此her

processing. The game fonn

1 and the payoff structure is summarized in table 1. (Base case values

in table 1 are for the example at the end ofthis section.) Note that most payoffs in the game
are costs. Most of these costs are products of the probability of detection and penalties ìf
detected.
4.1. Period 0: Actions by Nature.

The game has two players. Player 1 (the

0伍 cial)

has one oftwo potential types: "c1 ean" and

"corrup t." Player 2 (the applicant) also has one oftwo potential types , based on the
application he presents: "acceptable" application and "unacceptable" application. Define an
acceptable application as one that meets the threshold for acceptance when evaluated by
operative standards set by leaders in locallicensing offices and communicated to licensing
officials at lower levels. Conversely, an unacceptable application is one that does not meet
the threshold for acceptance when evaluated by these standards.
The official has complete information: he knows with certainty both his own type and
the applicant's type. The applicant knows neither the official's type nor his own type , but
must estimate these based on incomplete information. Let Pl denote the applicant's estimated
prior probability that the application is acceptable; 1 - Pl denotes the prior probability that the
application is unacceptable. Let P2 denote the applicant's estimated prior probability that the
official is c1 ean; 1 - P2 denotes the prior probability that the official is corrupt.
4.2. Period 1: First A ction by the Officia l.

In period 1 only the

0伍 cial

takes an action a1. The action space has two elements: "accept"

the application and "reject" the application. If the
22
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accepts the application, the game
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ends in this period.
The applicant has payoff 0 in this period -- whether the official accepts or rejects the
application. This is because the game begins with the submitted application: if the official
accepts the application, the applicant has incurred only the cost of preparing the application,
which is prior to the game; if the

0伍 cial

rejects the application , the applicant incurs costs

that depend on actions chosen in period 2 and (sometimes) in period 3.
Payoffs to the official depend on whether or not the application is in fact acceptable.
If the application is

acceptab泊，

the

0伍 cial

has payoff 0 if he accepts it; if the application is

unacceptable, the official has payoff 0 if he rejects it. In both cases , the

0伍cial

is doing his

job (and payoff 0 indicates no costs)
Define a clean official as one who always accepts acceptable applications , always
rejects unacceptable applications , and always rejects bribes. A corrupt

0伍cial

may.do

otherwise. If the application is acceptable, the corrupt official has payoff -A 1 if he rejects it.
Trus reflects the cost of harassing a qualified applicant by r司 ecting an acceptable application.
If the application is unacceptable, the corrupt official has payoff -C 1 if he accepts it. This
reflects the cost of allowing an unqualified applicant to get through.
From a myopic perspective , both officials prefer in period 1 to accept an acceptable
application and reject an unacceptable application, incurring payoffs of 0 (i.e. , no costs) for
these actions. However, a co叮u pt official would prefer a bribe , which in trus game he can
obtain only if the application is rejected in period 1. 14 F or this reason , a corrupt official may
choose to reject an acceptable application and incur a payoff of -A 1 in period 1, in the
expectation of gaining a positive payoff with a bribe later in the game. 15
4.3. Period 2: Action by the Applicant.

In period 2 the applicant takes an action a2 (a response to a 1 "reject" in period 1). The action
23
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space has two elements: offer a "bribe" to the 。但 cial and "revise and resubmit" the
application according to specificatioris set out by the official who 吋 ects the application. In
setting out these specifications, the co叮upt official evaluating an unacceptable application
presents the applicant with costs of revising and resubmitting that approximate those of an
unqualified applicant
If the applicant revises and resubmits the application , the game ends because the
official is obliged to accept it. 16 Payoffs in this period are 0 for the 。但 cial. (If the
application is in fact acceptable , the official's payoffs in the end will include the cost A 1
associated with harassment in period 1.)

Payo丘S

are -C 2 for the applican t. This is the cost of

revising and resubmitting the application. Ifthe applicant offers a bribe, the game continues ,
with payoffs for both players determined by the action chosen in period 3.

4.4. Period 3: Second Action by the Officia l.
In period 3 the official takes an action a 3 (a response to a2 "bribe" in period 2). The action
space has t\\'o elements: "accept" the bribe and the application and "reject" the bribe and the
application (again)
If the official is clean , the application is by definition unacceptable: otherwise it
would have been accepted in period 1. The bribe and application are rejected , with payoff 0
for the official: he is simply doing his job. The applicant has no alternative but to revise and
resubmit the application , 17 with the resu It ing payoff -A 2 - C 2 . This reflects the costs of
offering a bribe to a clean official and revising and resubmitting the application.
Now consider the situation if the official is corrup t. If the corrupt

0伍 cial

rejects the

bribe and the application , his payoff is 0 in this period. (Again , if the application is in fact
acceptable , the 0伍 cial's payoffs in the end include the cost A 1 of harassment in period 1.) As
above , the applicant has no altemative but to revise and resubmit the application, with
24
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resulting payoff -C 2, reflecting the cost of this action. J8
But the

co汀upt 0伍 cial

may accept the bribe and application. Hi s payoffs then

depend on whether or not the application is in fact acceptable. If the application is
acceptable, he has payoffs M - B l' This is the bribe (a benefit for the offici a1) mÏ nus the cost
of accepting a bribe from a qualified applican t. 19 The applicant has payoff -~任， the bribe (a
cost for the applicant). Ifthe application is unacceptable , the 0伍 cial has payoffM - DJ. This
is the bribe he receives mÏ nus the cost of accepting a bribe and

application 企oman

unqualified applican t. 20 The applicant's payoffis -M - B2' which is the bribe plus the cost of
bribing an official to accept an unacceptable application.

4.5. Analysis.
The interesting question is what the applicant wi lI do when his application is rejected in
period 1. Assuming (as 1 do here) that he does not exit the bureaucratic process aIt ogether,
the applicant may choose either to offer a bribe or to revise and resubmit the application. If
he chooses to offer a bribe , he must also choose a bribe size. The applicant must make these
choices without knowing where he is located on the game tree: after the application is
rejected in period 1, he knows only that he has not submitted an acceptable application to a
clean officia 1. He does not know whether he has submitted an acceptable application to a
corrupt

0伍 cial

(node

α) ，

submitted an unacceptable application to a c1 ean

0伍 cial

(node ß) ,

or sub m.itted an unacceptable application to a corrupt official (node y).
To solve for the conditions in which bribery constitutes an equilibrium, 1 follow the
usual analytic practice of starting at the bottom of the game tree and working by backward
induction. Starting at the bottom ofthe game tree , supposing the applicant offers a bribe,

how big must the bribe be in order jor it and the application to be accepted? The answer
depends on the costs to the 0伍 cial of accepting the bribe. These costs vary, depending on
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the applicant's type and the 0伍 cial's type. If the applicant is at node ß, by definition no bribe
can be big enough to tempt the official to accept it: at this node , the application is
unacceptable and the

0伍 cial

is clean. A clean 0自 cial

and all bribes. This is re f1 ected in the

r司 ects

all unacceptable applications

0伍 cial' s payoff ﹒∞ of accepting

a bribe.

Let mß denote the bribe the official will accept if the applicant is at nodeβ
Then mß =∞. The 0伍 cial accepts no bribe, however big.

If the applicant is at node γ， the official may accept a bribe: at this node , the application is
unacceptable but the official is corrup t. If the official rejects the bribe and application , he
incurs no cost. In order for him to accept the bribe and application it must at least meet his
cost of doing so , which is Dl.

Let m'Y denote the bribe the official will accept if the applicant is at node y.
Then

m'Y這 D10

The minimum bribe the

0 伍 cial

will accept is D10

If the applicant is at node α ， again the official may accept the bribe: at this node , the
application is acceptable and the official is corrup t. In accepting the bribe and application ,
the corrupt official incurs a cost of B10 But at this node it is not costless for the official to
reject the bribe and application: as the application is in fact acceptable, having required the
applicant to revise and resubmit it is harassment of a qualified applicant , which carries a cost
to the

0伍 cial

of A10 In choosing whether or not to accept a bribe at this node , the official

takes into account that in rejecting it he is obliged to pay A10 This situation reduces (ioeo ,
合om

Bl ) the bribe the

0伍 cial

requires in ord.ef to make it worth rus while to accep t.
26

Corruplion by

D臼 ign

Letmαdenote

the bribe the offici a1 will accept if the applicant is at node α.

Thenmα 注 Bl

- Al' The minimum bribe the

0伍 cial

will accept is B 1 - Al'

Further, as D 1 > B 1 > Ah then mY > mα21 This implies that , whether or not the application is
in fact acceptable , a coπupt
reject any bribe less than

0伍 cial

wiU accept any bribe greater than or equal to mY and

mα﹒

a-

Given the bribes specified above for different combinations of applic ut and official
types and moving up the game tree to the applicant's choice, if the applicant chooses to offer
a bribe , which bribe 1iJill he offer? The applicant does not want to offer a bribe bigger than

needed for the application to be accepted (e.g., mY if he is at node α) ， nor does he want to
offer a bribe he expects will be rejected (e.g., any bribe if he is at

node 戶 ormαifhe

is at

node y)
Clearly, the bribe to offer (in cI uding here no bribe , i.e. , a bribe of 0) depends on
whether the applicant is at node

α(acceptable

app Ii cation , corrupt offici a1), node

ß

(unacceptable application , cI ean official) , or node y (unacceptable application, corrupt
official). \Vhat are the respective probabilities of being at these nodes? They are not the
product of the applicant's prior probabilities about the three combinations: by the time the
applicant has reached these nodes , he has acquired information that allows him to update
those priors -- he has learned that he has not submitted an acceptable app Ii cation to a clean
officiaI. 1 model the caIculation of these new probabilities as a Bayesian updating of priors ,
given rejection of the application in period 1. Let A denote an acceptable application , and A
denote an unacceptable application. Let r denote rejection of the application in period 1. Let
C denote a clean official , and C denote a corrupt

0伍 ciaI.
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By Bayes' rule: p (A Ir) = p (A and r)

p (r)
Substituting the applicant's priors yields: p (A Ir)

= Pl - Pl P2
1-

Pl P2

This is the probability of an acceptable application, given rejection in period 1.
Sirnilarly, by Bayes' rule: P (C Ir) = P (C and r)

p (r)
Substituting the applicant's priors yields : p (C Ir) =

P2 - Pl P2
1 - Pl

P2

This is the probability of a clean official , given rejection in period 1.
Again , by Bayes' rule: p (C Ir) = p (C and r)
p (r)

Substituting the applicant's priors yields : p (C Ir)

This is the probability of a corrupt official , given

=

1-

P2

1-

Pl P2

r貝jection

in period 1

These conditional probabilities can be used to compute the updated probabilities ofbeing at
nodes α，戶， and y
The applicant knows after rejection in period 1 that he has not submitted an
.acceptable application to a clean
吋 ection，

0伍 cia1.

Therefore, if the application is acceptable, given

the official must be corrup t. The probability of being at

nodeαis

probability of having an acceptable application, given rejection in period 1:

28

simply the

Corruption by

p(α)

D臼ign

= P (A Ir) = Pl - Pl P2
'

A

DA--a p

可b

••

If the application is unacceptable, however, rejection in period 1 gives the applicant no
information about the

0伍 cial's

type. The probability of being at node

ß must take into

account the probability that the application is unacceptable and the probability that the
。伍 cial

is clean, with both probabilities given rejection in period 1:

p (戶 )=p(互 Ir) p (C Ir)
An d as p (互 Ir) = 1 - P (A Ir) , then

p (戶 )=p(互 Ir) p (C Ir) = P2 - 2 Pl P2 + P12 P2
，
，
勻&

、、'，'，

、 /-

可aEA

'a
，‘、、

ny DA

Similar1 y, the probability of being at node y must take into account the probability that the
application is unacceptable and the probability that the official is

corru阱，

both probabilities

given rejection in period 1

p (y) = p (互 Ir) p (C Ir) = 1 - Pl - P2 + Pl P2
可

、‘，
j

、F
H

priors 一 conditional

唔，EA

'，'、、

These updated

ny--A ny

probabilities of being at nodes α，戶， y, respectively, given

rejection in period 1-- add up to 1
Returning now to the question posed above , if the applicant chooses

to 功是r

a bribe ,

which bribe will he offer? The answer can be computed by comparing the expected payoff of
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offering the minimum of mαwith the expected payoff of offering the minimum of m'T . (As
the appropriate bribe at node

ß is 0 , this calculation is not relevant here.)

Ifthe applicant

chooses to offer a bribe, he will offer the bribe with the highest expected payoff (in this
an a1 ysis , the lowest expected cost). These expected values take into account the probabilities
of being at nodes α，戶， and y and the cost of offering a bribe (mαorm可 at each of thes e
nodes. For example, the calculation takes into account that ifthe applicant is at node 戶
(unacceptable application , clean 0伍 cial) ， neither bribe wi l1 be accepted: the cost to the
applicant wi lI be A 2 + C 2, which is the cost of offering a bribe to a clean official plus the cost
of revising and resubmitting (b ecause the clean

0伍 cial

will

r司 ect

the bribe and not reverse

the original rejection of the application) . It also takes into account that a bribe of mαis too
small to be accepted at node y (unacceptable application , corrupt 0 伍 cial): the cost to the
applicant of offering this bribe at node y is C 2, the cost of revising and resubmitting (because
the bribe is not big enough to be accepted , even though the official is corrupt). These
expected costs are as follows :

E (offering m U , the smaller bribe) =
PA ny
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E (offering m"f, the bigger bribe) =
ny DA
可h

ny

om"f+
ny
勻，&

唔，EA
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P2 - 2 Pl P2 + P12 P2
一一一一一一﹒ (A 2

+ C 2) +

(1 - Pl P2)2
1 - Pl - P2

+ Pl P2

一--------﹒ (m"f

+ B2)
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1f an applicant chooses to bribe, he will offer the bribe with the lowest expected cos t.

If E (offering

mα)

(offe丘 ngm可>

> E (offering

E (offering

mα) ，

But wi !l the applicant choose

mγ) ，

the applicant offers m"f minimum; if E

he offers

10

That is:

mαmlmmum.

offer a bribe at all? He wi Il, ifthe cost ofnot

offering a bribe (which is C2, the cost of revising and resubmitting the application) exceeds
the expected cost associated with offering a bribe. That is:

If E (offering

mα)

> E (offering m1) and C2 > E (offering

mγ) ，

the applicant

mα) ，

the applicant

offers minimum bribe mY•
IfE (offering

m可>

E (offering

offers minimum bribe
But ifE (offering

mα)

mα)

and C2 > E (offering

mα .

> C2 and E

(offeri 時 m可>

(revise and resubmit , do not bribe).22
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In su m, bribery is an equilibrium when C2 is greater than the expected cost of offering
either the smaller bribe mαor the bigger bribe mr . An d the equilibrium bribe is the bribe
associated with the smaller of these two expected costs. Wh en C2 is a smaller cost than the
expected costs associated with offering either the larger or smaller bribe, then bribery is not
an equilibrium solution: the applicant is better off to offer no bribe, but instead to respond to
a rejection by revising and resubmitting the application. The conditions under which bribery
is or is not an equilibrium (and , if an equilibrium, the equilibrium bribe size) depend , then , on
the expected costs of offering

mαand mγ(given

in the formulas above) relative to the value of

C2 and relative to each other.
4.6.λTumerical

Example.

To illustrate the solution above , 1 offer a numerical example. 1 assign to game parameters
some values that are consistent 'Nith the empirical account in section 3 and appear to me
plausible. These base case values are presented in table 1. 1 assign a value of 0 .4 to Ph the
prior probability of submitting an acceptable application, and the same value to P2' the prior
probability of encountering a clean officia1. Substituting the assigned values into the
formulas above , 1 calculate the expected costs of offering

mαand

mY, respectively , and

compare the lowest of these values with the cost of revising and resubmitting the
application. 23 Results are as follows: E (offering mα)

=

24.24; E (offering mY)

=

24.16; the

lowest of these (m Y) is also lower than the cost of revising and resubmitting the application
(C 2 = 32). At these assigned values, bl幼 ery is an equilibrium , and the equilibrium bribe is
m~

the larger of the two bri bes. 24

5. The Value of Personal Connections.
The game presented above models the strategic interaction between a licensing official with
perfect information and an applicant with imperfect information. Many entrepreneurs
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interviewed altered this information asymmetry by ar-r anging transactions through personal
connections. Personal
合om)

conn的tions

are relationships with a history that is prior to (and apart

the specific relationship defined by the formallicensing process: personal connections

establish terms of familiarity between applicants and licensing officials. Personal
connections include already established informal direct connections between applicants and
officials who evaluate their applications and (more commonly) indirect connections through
other parties. Wh en applicants encounter licensing
(shuren) , they expect the encounter to be

0元 cials

different 企orL

as "familiar acquaintances"

l._Jt modeled in section 4 above.

Specifically, they expect officials will do their best to help them and wiU certainly not
attempt to deceive them. This does not come free of charge. Simply by activating personal
connections , applicants begin the process of making payments or incurring obligations to
make payments in the future. Payments are typically non-cash gifts or favors. They may be
paid (or owed) to licensing officials directly or to other parties who act as middlemen , taking
on reponsibility for payments to licensing officials.
Put another way, choosing to exploit personal connections is equivalent to making a
payment in some amount before starting the process of enterprise licensing. In retum for
upfront payments , applicants get reliable information about their own types (i .e. , whether
applications are acceptable or unacceptable) and about

0伍 cials'

types. Unlike bribes ,

however , these payments are not illicit (for applicants or officials): they are simply private
compensation to acquaintances for reliable , non-confidential expertise. 25
Wh y do some applicants choose to transact through personal connections? In the

formulation above , the value to applicants of personal connections in the licensing process is
the expected νa/ue ofpelfect information , which transforms the signaling game in section 4

above into a non-game. This expected value can be calculated and compared to the expected
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value of the signaling game. Assuming that the latter value is larger, the difference between
the two is the maximum amount applicants will pay (or commit to pay) as up企ont
"connection fees."
As in the signaling game, 1 assume the application is acceptable or unacceptable, with
respective prior probabilities of Pl and 1 - Pl' Similarly, 1 assume the official (now a familiar
acquaintance) is clean or corrupt , with respective prior probabilities of P2 and 1 - P2' 1
assume also that a connection fee is transacted prior to the interaction (described below)
between applicant and

0伍 cial

If the application is acceptable, the
the applicant and the

0伍 cial

0伍 cial

arranges for it t6 be accepted.

Payo位 to

are O. Ifthe application is unacceptable, the official offers this

information and the applicant offers a bribe in the amount of mY (the bigger bribe in the
signaling game , covering Db the cost to a co汀upt official of accepting an unacceptable
application). Payoffs depend on whether the official is clean or corrup t. A clean 0 伍 cial
rejects the bribe and makes no arrangements for the application to be accepted. The clean
。伍 cial

has a payoff of 0; the applicant has a payoff of -C 2, which re f1 ects the cost of revising

and resubmitting the application. That

芯，

1 assume here that a clean official is clean

regardless of whether the applicant is a stranger or an acquaintance , but that there is no cost
to the applicant associated with offering a bribe to a clean official if he is an acquaintance
(i .e., no A2). A corrupt official accepts the bribe and arranges for the application to be
accepted : the official has a payoff ofmY - D 1; the applicant has a payoff of -m)'.
To calculate the expected value of perfect information, 1 simply sum the probability
of each ofthe three possible outcomes above mu It iplied by their respective payoffs to the
applicant:
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Pl . 0 + (1 - Pl) P2 . C 2 + [(1 - Pl) (1 - pJ] . Dl =
(1 - Pl) P2 . C 2 + [(1 - Pl) (1 - P2)] . Dl

Substituting the base case parameter values yields 13.44 as the expected value of perfect
information.
Wh at is the expected value of applying for a license without exploiting personal

connections? It is the expected value of the licensing process with impe自 ct infonnation,
which is the expected value to the applicant of the signaling game. The analysis and
numerical example in section 4 provides this expected value (i.e. , expected cost) conditional
on rejection of the application in period 1. 1n choosing whether or not to exploit

person 叫

connections , however, the applicant is choosing between aIt ernatives before he begins the
signaling game. The appropriate comparison , therefore, is the expected value ofthe entire
signaling game (not only that

pa口 of it

conditional on rejection ofthe app 1i catiön). This is

the sum of two products : the probability of rejection in period 1 mu It iplied by the expected
value given r貝jection， and the probability of acceptance in period 1 multiplied by the
expected value given acceptance. The expected value (i.e., expected cost) given rejection is
the equi Ii brium bribe mγcaIculated in section 4. An d as the expected value to the applicant
given acceptance is 0 , the Iatter product is O. This means the expected value ofthe entire
game is the

equilib 討um

bribe

mγmultip Ii ed

by the probability of r司 ection in period 1:

m'f (1 - PIP2) = 24.16 . [1 - (0 .4 )(0 .4)]

= 20.29

Subtracting the expected value of personaI connections (13 .4 4) from this expected value
yields 6.85 . This is the maximum amount applicants 叫11 pay as connection fees . Wh ether or
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not applicants choose to exploit personal connections, then, depends on whether they can do
so for no more than this amoun t. This can depend on the network of personal connections
available to applicants: applicants may have a wide or narrow range of personal connections ,
and even applicants who are not generally welI -connected may have a fortuitous connection
that serves them wel I. (F or example, an app Ii cant whose former student or younger brother
works as a licensing official evaluating applications is probably able to exploit this personal
connection for very Iittle.)
6. Comparative Statics: Policy Change and Corruption Contro l.

Changes in economic policy orientation in 1992 produced important changes in enterprise
licensing policy: a significant relaxation of standards defining acceptable applications and an
increase in transparency in enterprise licensing. These changes are changes in institutional
design. Ongoing efforts to control bureaucratic corruption through increased enforcement
and educational campaigns can also a1t er institutional design. Changes in design can be
analyzed as changes in base case parameter values for the signaling game in section 4.
A1 tering the values assigned to game parameters a1t ers the numerical results. It does

not necessarily a1ter the substantive resu 1t ofbribery as an equilibrium or the

equilib 討 um

bigger bribe size. This section examines the robustness of these substantive equilibria when
parameter values are differen t. The varying parameter values in the comparative statics
exercises below re f1 ect empirical variation in the institutionaI design of enterprise licensing.
6.1 . Changes in Policy.

In spring 1992 Deng Xi aoping gave widely publicized

suppo吋 to

rapid economic growth and

market forces in a series oftalks during a tour ofthe economicalI y advanced south (see Deng
18 Jan.-21 Feb. 1992). This orientation to the "sociaIi st market economy" was endorsed at a
meeting convened by the Central Committee in June and again , formaIIy as policy, at the
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14th Party Congress in October. The SAIC responded quickly and unambiguously to Deng's
message in a document calling for a major reduction in the number of approvals and

pem世ts

required prior to licensing. Requirements "beneficial to economic development" were to be
kept in place; others were to be gradually invalidated (S Al C 5 June 1992; see also Liu 1993)
The SAl C document was aimed mainly at encroachments by government economic
departments , which over the years had used approval and permit authority to restrict entry
(and , thereby , competition) in order to maintain state enterprise monopolies in their
respective trades and industrial sectors (see especialI y Fang 1992). To

suppo口 these

monopolies , economic departments had increased the number of permits required and had set
up an examination and approval process that was a "virtual labyrinth" for applicants outside
the state enterprises directly under the departments: "Applicants have no iqea where they will
collide into a wall , no way to predict what will happen" (Fang 1992:63).
the SAl C noted that private enterprises in

戶口icular

A: _deputy head of

faced "a forest of checkpoints in the

examination and approval process" (Gan 1993: 15). Predictably, given the implicit chaIl enge
to powerful bureaucratic interests , the process of actually invalidating specific national and
local stipulations to re f1 ect the SAIC policy guidelines was (and continues to be) fai rI y
slow. 26
Despite the slow pace of change for

0伍 cial

standards , local bureaus of industry and

commerce throughout the country responded quickly with significantly relaxed operative
standards for enterprise licensing (see, e.g. , Wan 1992; Cao 1993; Sun 1993). Obviously,
however, if standards defining acceptable applications are relaxed , but applicants have no
more information than before , applicants wiIl underestimate the probability that their
applications are acceptable. Leaders of locallicensing offices described this situation as a
lack oftransparency (t oumingdu) in enterprise licensing. To address this problem , bureaus of
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industry and commerce renewed earlier efforts (see SAIC 23 July 1988 , 20 Mar. 1990) to
make the new standards public. Licensing 0伍ces set up bulletin boards, displayed w a11
posters , and printed boo k1 ets out 1i ning conditions for acceptable applications , procedures,
time restrictions , documentary evidence requirements, and fees. Al l of these methods
communicated standards through channels other than licensing 0伍 cials themselves.
Some leaders of Iocallicensing offices characterized these increases in transparency
as anti-corruption measures: by this logic , if an acceptable app Ii cation is easier to prepare
than applicants previously imagined , and if applicants know what constitutes an acceptable
app Ii cation , then they are more likely to know when officials misrepresent the status of
acceptable applications .
These changes in po Ii cy can be represented as changes in parameter values in the
signa Ii ng game. The effect of relaxation of standards can be analyzed by reducing the cost of
revising and resubmitting applications (C 2) from the base case value of 32. The combined
effect of relaxation of standards and increased transparency can be analyzed by increasing
app Ii cants' priors for acceptable applications (Pl) from the base case value of 0 .4. Resu It s of
these exercises in comparative statics are presented in figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 ilI ustrates expected values for offering the sma lI er and bigger bribes and the
cost of revising and resubmitting app Ii cations when that cost (C 2) varies. As expected valu es
are expected costs , equilibria are the Iowest (not highest) values . Holding other base case
values constant and reducing the cost of revising and resubmitting applications by only a very
smalI amount (i .e., from the base case value of32) shifts the equilibrium from the bigger to
the sma lI er bribe. This is a fai rI y robust equilibrium : further reductions in C 2 do not affect
the smalI er bribe equi Ii brium untiI C 2 reaches the extremely smaIl value (i .e. , relative to base
case values) of about 4. At that point , the equilibrium shifts from bribery to revising and
38
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resubmitting the application. This value (comparable to the base case cost of offering a bribe
to a c1 ean 0伍 cial) is much too small to reflect the current situation in enterprise licensing.
Nor, in my understanding, is this value big enough to reflect a fu心re in which all approvals
and permits 企om government economic departments have been eliminated in practice. 27
Figure 3 ilI ustrates expected values for offering the smalI er and bigger bribes and the
(here unvarying) cost of revising and resubmitting applications when applicants' estimated
priors for acceptable applications (Pl) are changed. Increasing these priors reflects the
simu 1t aneous relaxation of standards and transparency in enterprise licensing (which
increases applicants' knowledge of these standards). Considering that transparency is viewed
as an anti-corruption measure, the resu 1t of the comparative statics exercise is quite
interesting. Holding other base case values constant , increasing priors for acceptable
applications reduces expected costs for each ofthe bribes. Not only is the substantive
equilibrium of bribery unchanged , but also bribery becomes an increasingly more attractive
choice for the applicant as the gap widens between the expected cost of the lowest bribe and
the cost of revising and resubmitting the application. Transparency does reduce corruption in
one non-trivial sense: with only a very small increase (from the base case value) in priors for
acceptable applications , the equi Ii brium bribe becomes the smaller (i nstead of the bigger)
bribe. Somewhat counter-intuitively, this equilibrium is extremely robust: holding other
values constant , the greater the applicant's estimated likelihood that his application is
acceptable, the more attractive the choice to offer the (smalI er) bribe.
6.2. Efforts 10 Control Corruptio n.

Since 1982 the Chinese government has engaged in an ongoing battle to control corruption in
its various forms , including bureaucratic corruption of the form analyzed here. Local bureaus
of industry and commerce have fo lI owed SAIC directives to launch periodic campaigns and
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implement more routine anti-corruption measures. At the first nationwide SAIC meeting on
IIbuilding cI ean government ," the SAIC head identified ideologic aI (i.e. , mor a1) education as
the crux of efforts to control corruption (Liu 1990). This approach focuses directly on
changing the character of officials by increasing the psychic costs of corruption. It assumes
that officials engage in corrupt actions because they have

coπupt

natures , which can be

modified through moral suasion. ldeological education campaigns are nearly always part of
major national anti-corruption campaigns , which are launched with fanfare every few years
and reported prominently in the media.
The SAIC has not , however , completely ignored a different approach to corruption
control: modifying the structure of incentives within wruch

0伍cials

act. In particular, local

bureaus of industry and commerce have made attempts to increase the costs of bribery to
officials. They have tried to strengthen detection by encouraging cI ients of the bureaus to
repo口 officials

who abuse public office , and they have periodically (usually during

campaigns) increased pena1t ies for bribery (see , e.g., SAIC , Investigation Group 1986; Hunan
Province , Hengyang Municipal Bureau of Industry and Commerce , Office of Supervision

These two different approaches to the control of corruption can be represented as
changes in parameter values in the signaling game. The effect of increasing the costs of
bribery to

0 伍 cials

can be analyzed by increasing either the cost of accepting a bribe 丘 om a

qualified applicant (B 1) or that of accepting a bribe from an unqualified applicant (D 1)
Because the latter is considerably easier to implement (especially through increasing
pena1ties) than the former , 1 analyze the effect of increasing Dl from the base case value of
16. 28 Resu 1t s are presented in figure 4.

Holding other base case values constant , increasing by a small amount the cost to
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of accepting bribes from unqualified applicants changes the equil.ibrium in the

sign a1 ing game 企om the bigger to the sm a11er bribe. Moreover, this new equilibrium is
extremely robust: changes in D} increase the expected cost ofthe bigger bribe, but not ofthe
smaller bribe; as a resu 1t, the smaller bribe becomes increasingly attractive to the applicant.
There is no parameter in the signaling game for analysis of the direct effect of
ideological education campaigns. lf such campaigns do succeed in changing preferences of
。伍 cials

by increasing the psychic costs ofbribery to them , this implies an increase in the

number of clean officials. Unquestionably, this will reduce corruption. ln terms of the
signaling game in section 4 , a greater number of acceptable applications will be accepted in
period 1, and a greater number of app Ii cants wilI not have to choose between bribery and
revising and resubmitting applications.
Here 1 consider some secondary effects of anti-corruption campaigns. 1 assume that
the publicity accompanying campaigns affects applicants' beliefs about behavioral norms in
the bureaucracy. This allows me to analyze effects of anti-corruption campaigns as changes
in applicants' priors about encountering clean

0伍 cials.

Resu 1t s are presented in figure 5.

Consider first the equilibrium for values of P2 above the base case value of 0.4.
Holding other base case values constant , increasing applicants' priors for encountering clean
o伍 cials

increases expected costs associated with each of the bribes. Bribery continues to be

the equilibrium (and the equilibrium bribe continues to be the bigger bribe) up to the point
where applicants' priors reach about 0.85. At that point , bribery ceases to be an equilibrium
soIution: the expected cost of offering either the bigger or smaIIer bribe exceeds the cost of
revising and resubmitting the application. The new equilibrium is revision and resubmission
ofthe application (without bribery).
ln short , quite independent of any possible direct effect of increasing the number of
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clean 0伍 cials， anti-corruption campaigns may change applicants' priors about the character
of licensing officials, which may in turn produce a change in the enterprise licensing
equilibrium: if applicants believe the proportion of clean 0伍 cials is high enough, they will
not offer bribes after their applications are rejected in period 1. 1n the longer term, if
applicants cease to offer bribes, then the "always reject" strategy of corrupt

。但 cials

in period

1 is no Ionger optimal for them.
Now consider a different possibility: the publicity associated with anti-corruption
campaigns may have the exact opposite

e丘ect

on applicants' priors. The campaigns may lead

applicants to conclude that licensing offices are teeming with
secondary effect is aIso re f1 ected in figure
value.

1nteresting旬，

5 一 in

co汀upt 0伍 ciaIs.

This

those values of P2 below the base case

however , a decrease in values of P2 has anti-corruption benefits too:

when applicants believe the proportion of cI ean officiaIs is low enough (at about 0.3) , the
equilibrium bribe size switches from the bigger to the smalI er bribe
7. Con cI usion.
The exercises in comparative statics indicate that corruption of the form analyzed here is
quite robus t. 1t appears to be relatively unproblematic to reduce corruption , in the sense of
reducing bribe sizes. lndeed , policy measures and anti-corruption efforts recently adopted
can be expected to have had this effect already. To move away entirely from

cor刊 pt

equilibria , however , requires far more dramatic change in institutional design.
The exercises suggest that even major changes in structures may be ineffective in
eliminating corruption entirely. Changes in expectations may be effective , but they must be
very substantial , if they are to achieve this end. Yet , this poses a problem: leaders strongly
committed to eliminating

co 汀uption

can rearrange structures to do so , even in an

environment where corruption is pervasive (see Klitgaard 1988); changes in beIi efs , however,
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cannot be similarly

mandated 企om

above, but can only be encouraged to

(see Manion 1993).

43

emerge 企om

below

NOTES

1. The SAIC also carries out a number of other supervisory and regulatory duties in the
economy. It drafts laws and regulations on the administration of industry and commerce,
manages trade at rural and urban markets , admi凶 strates markets for capital goods and sc訂ce
commodities, coordinates and implements investigation and punishment of illegal economic
activities, studies and monitors the development of the private economy, manages advertising
and the use of trademarks , oversees the administration of economic contracts , and acts as
arbiter in economic contractual disputes. These duties are becoming more important as direct
control of the economy through central planning is gradually replaced by indirect regulation
of the "sociaIi st market economy."
2. Others are: taxation , customs , public security, and the judiciary.
3. These issue are relevant , ho\vever , in the determination of pena1t ies (see section 3 .4

below) .
4. There has been 0伍 cial debate on the appropriate size of the private economy , which

may have implications for limiting the number of private enterprises. The SAIC journal
reported a suggestion (by noted economist Li Yining) of 30 percent as an appropriate limit on
the size of the private economy, but no 0伍 cial standard has been adopted (" Siying jingji de
bili xiangding" 1989).
5. These documents are reproduced in published collections (see SAIC , Bureau of
Enterprise Licensing 1985 , 1988 , 1989; SAIC , Legal Bureau 1991 , 1992; Gongshang
xingzheng guanli xianxing youxiao guizhang huibian

ρ979.1-1991.12)

documents are reproduced in the journal Gongshang xingzheng guanli.

1992. New
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6. See the discussion in section 6.1 below.
7. Collections of documents on enterprise licensing are sold at the publishing outlet,
but not at bookstores; some collections are classified as intemal (neibu); and keeping up to
date on changing stipulations requires reading the SAIC joumal and joumals ofprovincial
bureaus of industry and commerce. Neither the SAIC joumal nor the provincial joumals are
widely available , and the SAIC joumal and some ofthe provincial joumals are classified as
intema1.
8. This assumes that investigations and verification (or post-licensing inspections) are
independent 企om
。伍 cials
pa口 ner

initial decisions to accept applications. At one licensing office 1 visited ,

work in pairs: each

0伍 cial

responsible for evaluation is assigned a permanent

to investigate and verify the materials for applications he accepts. This arrangement

can facilitate cooperation in corruption
9. Applicants can submit to a formal administrative appeals process , but they are
unlikely to do so and unlikely to succeed if they do so. See section 3.3 below.
10. 1 note here that in the game theoretic analysis of section 4 , 1 simplify by assuming
that costs of operating without a license are high enough that applicants will make attempts to
obtain one. 1n reality , this is not always so. The SAIC journal has reported cases of
enterprises going unlicensed because of delays and difficulties in obtaining
government economic departments
one municipal district licensing

(see，呵， Lan

0伍 ce

1 visited ,

permits 企om

and Lian 1991; Yuan and Zhang 1993). At

0伍 cials

estimated that small businesses

easily operate unlicensed without being detected by their officiaIs , but that they usualIy can
detect larger enterprises operating unlicensed (Licensing Office Interview 93084). 1n rural
localities , larger enterprises are likely to experience even greater difficulties in avoiding
detection if they operate unlicensed.
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11. 1 have seen no evidence that such penalties are in fact imposed.
12. 1 have encountered no cases of applicants serving prison tenns or tenns of forced
labor simply for bribery in enterprise licensing.
13. Some officials have suggested that low salaries account for the corruption, a view
rejected by the SAIC head: acknowledging the low salaries, he argued nonetheless that
ideological education is the crux ofbuilding clean government (Liu 1990).
14. The corrupt

0伍 cial

j

in this game is passive. 1 note here that a more active fonn of

corruption, solicitation of bribes , is not only more cost1 y to the

0伍 cial

(pena1ties if detected

are higher; probability of dectection is probably higher) but also unnecessary: the analysis
below concludes that , for parameter values chosen to reflect the institutional design described
in section 3, the applicant's optimal strategy when the application is rejected is to offer a
bribe
15 . 1n the analysis that follows , 1 initially assume a strategy "always reject" for the
coπupt

officia1. This strategy tums out to be optimal for the

co汀upt

official for assigned

base case parameter values. Moreover, bribery proves to be a fairly robust equilibrium when
parameter values are altered in section 6
16. The game form presented in figure 1 simplifies in representing this: the obligation
to accept a revised application is reflected in the payoff structure; after aIl
resubmit" branches , payo 位

assume

~'revise

and

the official can only accept the application.

17. Again , the representation ofthis in the game form presented in fi忽lre 1 simplifies
by assurning this in the payoff structure.
18. Note that 1 assume here that the applicant pays no cost of offering a bribe to a
corrupt officia1. But we can easily conceive (and somewhat less easily mod e1) that corrupt
o伍 cials

may report offers of bribes from applicants with unacceptable applications -46
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especially during anti-corruption campaigns and when these bribe offers are too small to
cover expected costs associated with accepting them.
19. That 尬， 1 assume here that an

0伍 cial

who accepts a bribe and

application 企oma

qualified applicant (after r貝jecting that applicant's application in period 1) pays a cost ofB}
but not an additional cost of Al.
20. That is, 1 assume here that an

0伍cial

who accepts a bribe and application from an

unqualified applicant pays a cost ofD 1 but not an additional cost ofC 1.
2 1. Note that this formulation of bribe size in terms of 0伍 cial's costs is consistent
with the relationship between bribe size and severity of penalties discussed in section 3.4
above.
22. 1 note here that
the

0伍 cial

mαminimum

and mY minimum were defined in terms that make

precisely indifferent between accepting and rejecting the bribe and application.

Therefore, in those conditions in which the app Ii cant offers a bribe, he offers the minimum
bribe +εso that the official is not indifferent between acceptance and rejection. For
simplification in the text , 1 have not in cI uded this epsilon amoun t.
23. Reca lI that

mαand

mY have been defined in terms of parameter values , as Bl - Al

and Dl' respectively.
24. The two expected costs are very cI ose in value. Comparative statics exercises in
section 6 indicate that the equilibrium at base case values is cI ose to a "switchpoint": small
changes in parameter values push the equilibrium to an increasingly robust smalI er bribe
equilibrium or bigger bribe equilibrium, depending on the direction of parameter change.
Judging from interviews , 1 would guess the smalI er bribe is the equilibrium (i .e., applicants
commonly pay officiaIs a private fee for doing their job but not the larger amount for illicit
services)
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25. Some en甘eprene叮s interviewed in Beijing commented that , in their experience,
transacting through personal connections \vas less common in highly marketized areas , such
as Guangzhou, compared to Beijing.

26. In 1993 the SAIC circulated a document that identified simplification of licensing
requirements as a m句 or focus of SAIC \vork for that year. It condemned the existing
examination and approval system as "a product and prop of the planned ecönomy" (S Al C 20
Feb. 1993). As recently as June 1994 Vice Premier Zhu Rongji criticized government
economic departments for their abuse of approval and pennit authority , indicating that the
problem had yet to be resolved. Zhu reiterated the call for simplification of licensing
requirements (Foreign Broadcast Infonnation Service 13 June 1994:20-21).
27. Even under the boldest plans set out by SAl C policy lnakers , ente中討 se licenses
\vill be required to meet SOlne standards that involve other govemment departments
(regulating areas such as environmental po lI ution , public health , and labor and personnel) and
involve some real cost of revising and resubmitting applications. For coπupt officials who
create costs of revising and resubmitting applications that are in fact acceptable , this small
value can 1i kely be met by overly bureaucratic requirements offonn alone.
28. Procedures are unlikely to detect bribery associated \vÏ th acceptablic applications ,
as such applications raise no suspicions \vhen investigated, verified , approval , or inspected.
Licensing offices could relatively easily raise the cost of accepting unacceptable applications
(C 1) , treating the action of a l1 0wing an unqualified applicant to get through as sufficient or
strong evidence ofbribery. But this might also increase the proportion of acceptable
applications rejected by c1 ean officials , \vho act cautiously to avoid any stigma associated
with suspicion ofbribery. Increasing D} has none ofthese counter-productive results.
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